

CD NO. 25X1

COUNTRY East Germany

SUBJECT SED Propaganda Line

DATE DISTR. 15 August 1955

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW) 25X1

DATE OF
INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. On 4 June 1955, the first secretary of an SED Kreis headquarters made a speech on the political situation. He stated that the Soviet - Yugoslav talks in Belgrade were a great success for the "peace camp". Tito could no longer be considered as an asset for the West, because he agreed to support Red-China's claim to membership at UN and to cooperate in Soviet attempts to bring about an easing of international tensions. The trip of the Soviet representatives to Belgrade proved the sincerity of the Soviet peace endeavors, because Khrushchev had to overcome old animosities against Tito in extending a hand of friendship to the Yugoslav chief of state. This example will have a great effect upon the East European people's democracies. Commercial agreements and treaties of mutual friendship will soon be concluded between Yugoslavia on the one side, and Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia on the other. The speaker mentioned that some party members were discussing the agreement reached between Tito and the Soviets in a derogatory way. Some people still consider Tito a traitor. Such an opinion was, however, utterly unfounded, because the Soviets found out that Tito was honest in his desire to work for peace.
2. A SED functionary conceded that a lively discussion by the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union about the Austrian peace treaty and the results of the Warsaw conference. Greater efforts were therefore required to make the East German population familiar with the Warsaw achievements. The most important result of the Warsaw conference was the strengthening of the socialist bloc strong enough to resist all Western aggression. On the other hand, the road to the reunification of Germany had been left open. It was Grotewohl who was mainly to be thanked for this.
3. Four-power negotiations at the summit may be expected to be held this summer. The SED functionary said, however, that it would be prudent not to expect too much from these negotiations.

[illegible]

~~SECRET - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

25X1

-2 -

The attitude shown by the Western powers so far indicates that they are not interested in a reunification of Germany. In order to be able to overcome this resistance to the peaceful solution of the German question, the USSR needs the support of the entire peace camp and of the German people. The possibility of further peace campaigns was indicated by the speaker who expressed the opinion that the creation of a belt of non-committed European countries would serve the cause of peace. An incorporation of people's democracies into this belt should not be rejected out of hand, but it must be made dependent on the maintenance of the political and economic régime of the people's democracies. The SED functionary also mentioned that the problem of a neutralized Germany had recently been discussed with great interest by party circles and the entire German population. With regard to the status of neutrality, it was stated that this meant a status of non-alignment, free from military alliances, irrespective of whether the country involved had a capitalist régime or not. Reference was made in this connection to Austria. The speaker added, however, that the Austrian model was not applicable to Germany, because a reunified and neutral Germany must have a Socialist régime. The entire peace camp and the USSR would accept the reunification of Germany only on condition that the country retained a Socialist régime.

Comment. It is noteworthy that the present report mentions for the first time that the incorporation of East European Satellites into a bloc of neutralized countries may be acceptable to the Soviets.

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY East Germany

SUBJECT SED Propaganda Line

DATE DISTR. 15 August 1955

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE
ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO.

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

1. On 4 June 1955, the first secretary of an SED Kreis headquarters made a speech on the political situation. He stated that the Soviet - Yugoslav talks in Belgrade were a great success for the "peace camp". Tito could no longer be considered as an asset for the West, because he agreed to support Red China's claim to membership at UN and to cooperate in Soviet attempts to bring about an easing of international tensions. The trip of the Soviet representatives to Belgrade proved the sincerity of the Soviet peace endeavors, because Khrushchev had overcome old animosities against Tito in extending a hand of friendship to the Yugoslav chief of state. This example will have a great effect upon the East European people's democracies. Commercial agreements and treaties of mutual friendship will soon be concluded between Yugoslavia on the one side, and Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia on the other. The speaker mentioned that some party members were discussing the agreement reached between Tito and the Soviets in a derogatory way. Some people still consider Tito a traitor. Such an opinion was, however, utterly unfounded, because the Soviets found out that Tito was honest in his desire to work for peace.
2. The SED functionary conceded that a lively discussion by the population of the Austrian peace treaty and of the Belgrade conference was understandable in view of the great importance of these events. It was unjustified, however, to overlook the results of the Warsaw conference. Greater efforts were therefore required to make the East German population familiar with the Warsaw achievements. The most important result of the Warsaw conference was the creation of a solid military bloc strong enough to resist all Western aggressions, while, on the other hand, the road to the reunification of Germany had been left open. It was Grotewohl who was mainly to be thanked for this.
3. Four-power negotiations at the summit may be expected to be held this summer. The SED functionary said, however, that it would be prudent not to expect too many results from these negotiations.

25X1

CLASSIFICATION ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION							
ARMY	X	AID	X	FBI								

25X1

SECRET

25X1

-2 -

The attitude shown by the Western powers so far indicates that they are not interested in a reunification of Germany. In order to be able to overcome this resistance to the peaceful solution of the German question, the USSR needs the support of the entire peace camp and of the German people. The possibility of further peace campaigns was indicated by the speaker who expressed the opinion that the creation of a belt of non-committed European countries would serve the cause of peace. An incorporation of people's democracies into this belt should not be rejected out of hand, but it must be made dependent on the maintenance of the political and economic régime of the people's democracies. The SED functionary also mentioned that the problem of a neutralized Germany had recently been discussed with great interest by party circles and the entire German population. With regard to the status of neutrality, it was stated that this meant a status of non-alignment, free from military alliances, irrespective of whether the country involved had a capitalist régime or not. Reference was made in this connection to Austria. The speaker added, however, that the Austrian model was not applicable to Germany, because a reunified and neutral Germany must have a Socialist régime. The entire peace camp and the USSR would accept the reunification of Germany only on condition that the country retained a Socialist régime.

25X1

SECRET